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Abstract. 2010 has witnessed many public consultations around the
world concerning Net neutrality. A second legislative phase that may
follow, could involve various structural changes in the Internet. The sta-
tus that the Internet access has in Europe as a universal service evolves
as the level of quality of service (QoS) to be offered improves. If guaran-
tees on QoS are to be imposed, as requested by several economic actors,
it would require introducing new indicators of quality of services, as well
as regulation legislation and monitoring of the offered levels of QoS. This
tendency in Europe may change the nature of the Internet from a best
effort network to, perhaps, a more expensive one, that offers guaranteed
performance. This paper presents an overview of the above issues as well
as an overview of recent research on net-neutrality, with an emphasis on
game theoretical approaches.
1 Introduction
Several public consultations on network neutrality policies have taken place in
2010. From them, regulation was introduced by the FCC in the USA [11], while
the European authorities feel there is no need for it [12, p. 3] at this moment.
France’s Assembly, meanwhile, is discussing a bill on net neutrality [13]. The
growing economic and social role of the Internet along with the fast evolution of
its performance and of the services it offers, have triggered evolution of the legal
status of the access to the Internet. Already on 2002, access to the Internet has
become an universal service in the EU, which should imply guarantees on QoS.
Even if data connections “should be capable of supporting data communications
at rates sufficient for access to online services such as those provided via the
public Internet”, the European Parliament understands that due to the hetero-
geneous nature of the Internet “it is not appropriate to mandate a specific data
or bit rate at Community level”, leaving Member States with the responsibility
of monitoring if the data rates provided by ISPs are “sufficient to permit func-
tional Internet access” [15, Whereas 5]. Nonetheless, this guarantee only covers
access to the narrowband Internet service, while the definition of the broadband
Internet service as a universal service is currently in discussion [14].
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From the debate on network neutrality we learn that new indicators of QoS
are sought, and that we should expect an intensive work of regulating and stan-
dardization bodies on defining requested minimum values of performance mea-
sures. By actually requiring QoS to be guaranteed to the end user’s actual ex-
perience (see e.g. [2] page 19), we may expect new legislation to create a new
reliable and yet more expensive Internet, that would be different than the best
effort type network that we have known.
This issue of a best effort versus a guaranteed performance network was
not only present in the debate on network neutrality, but could be central in
the legislation that would follow that debate. Another new comer issue is that
of imposing taxes on content providers by the government. We provide more
details on both issues in the next section.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview on
(i) the Internet as a universal service, (ii) the legislation concerning QoS, and on
(iii) economic issues that arise in the debate on network neutrality. The following
section provides a brief non exhaustive overview on mathematical models related
to the neutral net question, with special focus on game theoretical models.
2 Overview
The economic aspects. The information and communication technologies have
a central economic role. Indeed, ”The information and communication technolo-
gies sector already generates revenue of 2,700 billion euros, or close to 7% of
global GDP, and could account for 20% of GDP within the next 10 years” [2].
The latter reference specifies moreover: ”Pyramid Research and Light Read-
ing predict a rise in annual worldwide revenue for voice and data services of
around 2.5% and 12.8%, respectively, between 2010 and 2013, while data traffic
is forecast to increase by 131% during that same period. To give an example, in
December 2009 ComScore reported that 5.4 billion videos had been watched in
France that year (a 141% increase over the year before), of which 1.8 billion on
YouTube.com between January and September”.
In Europe, 5% of its GDP, i.e. 660 billion annually, comes from the IT sector,
with 250 million daily Internet users and a penetration of the mobile market close
to 100% [16].
Internet as a tool for exercising the freedom of speech. In 2009,
France passed a law against non-authorized downloading of copyrighted ma-
terial. Measures against file-sharing included disconnection from the Internet
through an administrative order. The Constitutional Council went back to the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (from the time of the
French revolution, two hundred years before the Internet was born) to conclude
that freedom of speech could not be trusted to a new nonjudicial authority in
order to protect holders of copyrights and neighboring rights. In their judge-
ment, it recognized that the Internet is an instrument for exercising the freedom
of speech. Similar relations between the Internet and the American constitution
(and amendments) have also been made in the USA, see [3] for more details.
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Recent events in the Arab world have shown us that people use Internet as a
source not only to express their opinion on governments, but also to coordinate
actions that allows overthrowing them. Governments have reacted, predictably,
by blocking not only the Internet but also the mobile phone service. However,
the effectiveness of these measures has been compromised with the release in
media outlets throughout the world, of videos recorded in those countries.
Internet Access as a universal service. Directive 2002/22/EC of the
European Union established the access to the Internet as a universal service,
i.e. a global service guaranteed to all end users, regardless of their geographical
location, at reasonable quality and reliability and at affordable price. Directive
2009/136/CD did not only request that access has a reasonable guaranteed ser-
vice quality, it further complemented this request by giving ANRs the power to
define the minimum QoS levels, in order to avoid service degradation, throttling
and blocking.
To apply the law, one needs to constantly monitor the QoS in order to check
if the targets values are indeed met. It is our conviction that this monitoring
should involve not only those who offer the services and access to the Internet
but also scientists that come from the public sector (research institutes and
universities) who do not have direct economic interests.
2.1 New indicators of quality of service needed
Since 2002, there has been an exponential increase in the internet traffic, with
new services and applications that appeared. In view of this huge growth, it has
become clear that levels of QoS that have been appropriate for 2002 are no more
sufficient, and moreover, there is a need in new indicators of QoS.
On the legislation side, there is a need to redefine the quality of services which
the European universal service should offer. This can be done also in legislation
at a state level. The first such initiative has been taken by Finland where already
on October 2009 [18], followed by Spain in February 2010 [17, Art. 53]. Both of
them require from providers a minimum guaranteed rate of 1 Mbps, a rate that
makes difficult to see how the new multimedia services that are available through
Internet could be provided.
Not surprisingly, we find the issue of QoS of today’s and of future Internet
in the center of the debate on network neutrality.
In [2], ARCEP (the French regulation body of Electronic Communications
Markets) proposes six general policy directions for the network neutrality policy.
The third one concerns QoS and it is summarized by: ”3rd direction: A connec-
tion to the Internet must be provided with a sufficient and transparent QoS.
To guarantee this, the Authority is launching sector-specific efforts to qualify
the minimum QoS parameters for Internet access, and is working to implement
specific indicators.”
The document further specifies: ”End users must be contractually informed
of the technical properties of their Internet access, so that they can know the
resources that have been assigned to them and the performance they can expect
under ”normal conditions” (i.e. ”best effort” operations)... Work also needs to
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be done on the contribution of other players in the equation (ISPs1, equipment
manufacturers, software providers, etc.)”.
How should one proceed to determine the required indicators of QoS as well
as their minimum value?
In the paragraph on QoS (related to the third proposed policy direction in
[2]), ARCEP first invites ”operators and the associations that represent them to
engage in sector-specific work devoted to setting minimum QoS parameters for
”Internet access” (availability, bandwidth, latency, packet loss, jitter, etc.).”
They then propose that ”this work could be the basis of exchanges with con-
sumer associations and be enhanced by close collaboration with other relevant
players, and particularly with ISPs since, as the designers of services and applica-
tions, they are particularly well suited to analyze user’s qualitative experience.”
Would it indeed be enough to put together the operators with the consumer
associations in order to come up with indicators and minimum levels of QoS?
Do the consumer associations have the experts to understand the impact of
choices of minimum values of quality of services, and of proposed indicators, on
the quality they would perceive? Do the legislators have these?
We recommend to involve in this work a third actor, such as research in-
stitutes and universities etc., that has the required experts in answering these
questions and has the commitment of contributing to progress of the society.
2.2 The involvement of end-users in determining policies in France
2010 has experienced dramatic events related to network neutrality question.
Exceptional legislation initiatives have been taken, that may pave the way to
shape a different future Internet. 2010 saw the first country, Chile, adopting a
legislation that establishes network neutrality. At the same year, a USA Court
shook the foundation of the Net neutrality in USA by denying the USA tele-
com regulation body, the FCC, the authority to take decisions and actions on
that topic. In preparation to legislation on the topic, public consultations were
launched in USA, France and the European Union (EU).
There is a huge difference in the number of participants between the Ameri-
can consultation, on one side, and the French and European ones, on the other.
In total there are more than 89,000 filings in the American one, where as the
French consultation was answered by only 121 stake holders [5] and the Euro-
pean one was answered 318 times [12]. As can be seen in the FCC web site,
the vast majority of the answers to the consultation in USA came from indi-
viduals who used a web tool provided by the platform savetheinternet.com
for the automation of this process. This tool had a very basic template with a
short standard text in favor of net neutrality, in which the interested individual
provided his name.
If the level of participation seems low for France, a country with close to 65
million people of which 68.9 % have access to Internet [6], we were shocked by
1 Internet Service Providers
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the number of responses that the European one attracted, as the EU has an
estimated two thirds more population than the USA.
Among the 121 responses made by stake holders [5] in the French consul-
tation, eight came from ISPs, four from networking vendors, six from content
production corporations, three from copyright collecting societies, eleven from
software and content providers, six from user associations, three from public ini-
tiative networks, four from other kinds of professional associations, two from a
group of experts gathered by Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet2, five from researchers,
and 67 from individual citizens.
The European call also showed low level of interest among stake holders,
attracting a total of 318 responses [12]. Of this relatively small participation,
34 answers came from ISPs, seven from infrastructure providers, two from mo-
bile phone manufacturers, 16 from national and regional authorities, 38 from
Internet-related organizations, 18 from media-related organizations, six from
content providers, 42 from industrial organizations, social, consumer and non-
governmental organizations, seven from other companies, ten from academic
institutions, three from political parties, and 145 from individual citizens.
We can compare these figures with the consultation process in Canada that
was initiated by the CRCT. It provided around three months for sending com-
ments to the commission. In addition it had several days of hearing. The com-
mission which received “437 initial comments, 35 reply comments, and 34 final
replies from parties (companies and advocacy groups) and individuals. In ad-
dition, an online campaign resulted in over 13,000 email submissions to the
Commission from individuals. At the oral hearing in July 2009, 26 presentations
were made. Finally, an online consultation initiated by the Commission resulted
in 1,400 additional individual comments” [7, §10]. Thus the response to both,
the French and the European consultations, are also much lower than the one
for the Canadian consultation.
2.3 Duration and timing
Of the three public consultation processes, the French was the shortest, running
for 39 days (April 9 to May 17, 2010), followed by the European, that extended
for 93 days (June 30, 2010 to September 30, 2010), and then the longest is the
American, which ran for 187 days (October 22, 2009 to April 26, 2010)3. The
French consultation is not only much shorter than the American. The timing
for the consultation was chosen to overlap the two weeks vacation period of
the Eastern holidays in France, in which many French spending vacations with
their families are disconnected from the politics. Since both the duration and
the timing of the consultation are under the control of the government, it seems
natural to speculate that the French government was not interested in having a
large participation. The European consultation was not only half as long as the
2 French State Secretary for the Digital Economy.
3 Due to the “Comcast” decision[8], the FCC extended the deadline for filing reply
comments in response to the NPRM from March 5 to April 26.
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American one, it also had the same problem of the French one, as it ran over the
summer holidays that usually spread from mid-July to mid-September, a period
of almost 60 days of very little activity by the consultees.
2.4 The impact of the government position
As both, the U.S. government led by President Obama and the FCC headed by
the Commissioner Genachoswki, have been strong proponents of the consecration
of the principle of net neutrality, either by an amendment of the Telecommu-
nications Act, or by an administrative mandate issued by the FCC itself, the
debate on net neutrality has been re-launched, achieving a media presence that
is usually very difficult to reach for such a complex issue that weaves together
three different areas of knowledge. In December 2010, the FCC issued a Report
and Order [11] as the conclusive and regulatory document obtained from the
NPRM. In it, the FCC keeps maintaining its authority to adopt rules on the
open Internet [11, Part IV], but not unanimously, as two of its members believe
that it does not so [11, p. 148-150, 188-193].
The European Union, both through the statement issued by the Commis-
sion under the Telecom Package4 as well as through Commissioners Reding and
Kroes, made it clear that the intention of the European government is to protect
the neutrality of the network.
We recall that in France, the conditions chosen to launch the consultation
seem to indicate that the government was not interested in receiving a large
number of responses. Minimizing the dimensions of the public debate associated
with the consultation may also be useful in order to avoid the French citizens
questioning other aspects of the government policy on the Internet. In particular,
the government was probably aware that public discussions on the HADOPI law5
could be triggered by the fact that the questionnaire of the French consultation
includes an important link between the HADOPI law and the proposed net
neutrality. The relatively limited interest in France in getting feedback from end
users should not be interpreted as a disinterest in the opinion of the various
economic actors. Indeed, as we have already seen, there was a conference held
by the ARCEP in which important economic actors participated6.
4 The Commission acknowledges in a declaration attached to the Telecom Package
that net neutrality is “a policy objective and regulatory principle to be promoted
by national regulatory authorities” [19].
5 Adopted in France last year and which bans downloading unauthorized copyrighted
content.
6 We were surprised not to see among the participants speakers from French universi-
ties or research institutes. In fact, the only two talks from Professors from universities
are from the USA. In addition, one can find video interviews of many stake holders
in the conference’s home page: http://www.arcep.fr/index.php?id=10370.
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2.5 Taxation issues
Among the issues that Net neutrality is concerned with are relations between
access and content providers along with related pricing issues, as well as the
possibility of an access provider to have exclusive agreement with some content
provider or some service provider.
In Europe, these issues take another dimension, due to the fact that many
large content providers (such as google, facebook etc) are non-european: these
are mainly American companies. These companies make large benefits from ad-
vertisement.
It is known that google pays very little taxes on this income, in contrast to
what google pays in the USA. In a context where all other actors related to
the Internet do pay taxes, applying network neutrality would mean favoring or
subsidising these providers that do not pay. To be more precise, Google managed
to cut 3.1 billion American dollars of taxes in the three last years by declaring
its foreign profits (made in Europe) in Bermuda. This enabled Google to reduce
its overseas tax rate to 2.4% . This is done using Irish law that allows to legally
shuttle profits into and out of subsidiaries there, thus escaping the Irish 12.5
% tax. Facebook is preparing a similar strategy to shift declared benefits from
Ireland to Caymans. For details, see [4].
The so-called “Zelnick Report” [9], which came out in France in January
2010, proposed to impose a tax on advertising revenue generated by the use of
online services from France. According to estimates put forward by the authors,
between 10 to 20 million euros would be collected mainly from U.S. content
providers (Google, Microsoft, AOL, Yahoo and Facebook). It is pertinent to
note that the report expresses concerns about the drop in advertising revenues
of the French content providers, citing the poor state of competition in the
French market for search engines, and certain behaviors (never clarified in the
text) of Google. Later, French President Nicolas Sarkozy supported this proposal
in a speech where he presented a set of policies to support the sector of cultural
content creation.
The French position concerning google had perhaps some impact. In Septem-
ber 2010, Google CEO Eric Schmidt met with the French president Sarkozy to
discuss the opening in Paris of a Google research center and the creation of a
European cultural institute[10]. Schmidt said that the only reason for this ini-
tiative is economic, since it considers the French market for online searches as
very dynamic. He added that in the meeting, the so-called “Google tax” was not
discussed and that he has not met with the French competition authority.
2.6 Incentives for Investments
One of the issues in the debate on Network Neutrality has been incentives for
investments in the infrastructure. Some argue that neutrality would create the
incentives and some argue that only a non–neutral net would guarantee that.
This problem has been partly resolved in the European Union when Internet
access was declared as a universal service. Indeed, there are several possible
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ways to finance the cost of Providing communications services to all end-users
comes. The Universal Service Directive allows providers to be compensated either
from public funds or through a cost-sharing arrangement between providers if it
is demonstrated that by complying with the universal service obligations they
incur a loss or suffer net costs that exceed normal commercial standards [1].
The latter reference further says: ”Member States are free to go beyond the
minimum requirements laid down in the Directive, the only stipulation being that
any additional obligation cannot be funded by a Levy on telecom providers.”
We note however that in order to guarantee that the development of infras-
tructure would continue, it may be necessary to upgrade also the legislation on
the universal service in order to apply it not just for the Internet access but
also to broadband Internet services, which has not yet been declared universal
service by the European community.
3 Mathematical modeling of Network Neutrality Issues
3.1 Conclusions of the models at a Glance
There is one particular economic issue that is at the heart of the conflict over
network neutrality. Hahn and Wallsten [26] write that net neutrality “usually
means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Inter-
net access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge
content providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users.”
This motivates the recent studies on the implications of being non-neutral and
of charging the content providers (CP).
Two central questions in the context of a possibly non-neutral Internet which
many researchers have tried to to answer are [37]: i) who would gain or loser in
the absence of neutrality; ii) will ISPs or CPs have more incentives to invest on
the network infrastructure. The heated debate on these questions involve legal,
economic and technological aspects, see e.g. [36]. There have not been much work
which involves all these expertise. Moreover, some of the existing works draw
contradictory conclusions due to their differences in the market modeling.
We first take a glance at the state of the art research before diving into
the details. We concentrate on the profits of the economic actors as well as the
incentive of investment when the network neutrality is abandoned. The main
results of existing work are summarized in Table 1. The first column lists the
recent work as well as the year of publication. The second column highlights the
power of ISPs in an Internet market. The charging of CPs may have different
impacts on network utility in the competing and the monopoly ISP markets.
The symbol
√
denotes that the performance metric is better off with network
non-neutrality. On the contrary, the symbol × represents a disadvantage in the
non-neutral networks. For the two questions raised above, only part of existing
works present definite answers. We use the symbol ⋆ to denote the case where
the authors provide a more complex result: they provide some conditions under
which the network non-neutrality is beneficial and others for which it is harmful.
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The symbol∅means that the authors have not studied that specific metric. From
this table, we can conclude that the available models do not seem to agree with
each other. However, the ISPs have more incentives to invest if they are better
off with no regulation, according to these studies (including [23, 32]).
Market ISP CP User Social ISP
Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus Investment
ET[38] One ISP
√ × √ × ∅
ET[38] Two ISPs × × √ × ∅
NOSW[34] Two ISPs
√ √ √ √ √
CBG[37] One ISP
√ × √ √ ×
JL[44] One ISP ∅ ∅ ∅
√ √
MSW[32] More ISPs ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
ALX[23] One ISP ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
HCCR[39] One ISP ⋆ ⋆
√ √
∅
HCCR[39] More ISPs ⋆ ⋆
√
⋆ ∅
Table 1. Comparisons of Existing Work on Net non-neutrality
Game theoretic modeling of neutral or non-neutral networks may consider
as actors that are involved in strategic interactions not only service providers
and content providers but also the users as well as the advertisement sector that
often represents a major source of revenue to the content providers. Not all game
theoretic models studied the net neutrality problem from a non-cooperative point
of view. When considering the relation between service providers and content
providers, some researchers have considered cooperative mechanisms to regulate
the price that one provider pays to the other. The Nash bargaining solution was
considered in [31, 22, 23] where as the Shapley value was considered in [27, 28].
The Nash bargaining paradigm is also known as the proportional fair rate
allocation in the traffic engineering [30]. It is the unique way of transferring
utilities that satisfies a well known set of four axioms [29] related to fairness. In
[27]-[28] the Shapley value (which is known to have some fairness properties [25])
has been used for deciding how revenues from end users should be split between
the service and the content providers. Interestingly, it is the service provider that
is seen to be the one that has to pay the content provider, which reflects the fact
that the benefits of the service providers are obtained thanks to the presence of
the content provider (assuming that users subscribe to the ISP in order to access
the content of the CPs).
3.2 Literature Survey
We classify the existing work mainly based on types of game models that are
used, i.e. noncooperative and the cooperative games. For the models concen-
trated on noncooperative price competition, we subdivide them into two classes.
One of them assumes the same QoS for the packets of all content providers. The
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other, on the contrary, allows an ISP to provider premier QoS for the content
providers that agree to pay to the ISP. Beside the game oriented studies, we
further describe a work that considers the neutrality issue in network utility
maximization.
Noncooperative Game without Considering QoS Differentiation Econo-
mides and Tag [38] proposed a model of two-sided market in which the ISPs play
the role of platform, collecting revenues from both the end users and the non-
competing content providers. The quantities of content providers and end users
are assumed to be normalized continuums. In the monopoly market, the demand
generated by end users is increasing with regard to the quantity of the CPs, while
decreasing along with the access price of the ISP. A CP has a positive externality
of revenue from advertisers, at the cost of payment to the ISP. According to their
analysis, the ISP and the users are better off, but the CPs’ surplus as well as the
social surplus are worse without network neutrality. In a duopoly market with
two ISPs and multi-homing CPs, the quantity of end users subscribing to one
ISP depends on not only the strategy of this ISP, but also that of its opponent.
By using non-cooperative game tool, the authors find that the total surplus as
well as the surplus of the CPs and the ISPs are better off at the equilibrium
under the neutral regulation. This is opposite to the monopoly ISP market.
Musacchio, Schwartz and Walrand [32] investigate a two sided market where
the CPs and the ISPs invest jointly on the network infrastructure. Each ISP is a
monopoly over its end users and the CPs can be contacted by all the users. The
total click rate (or flow rate equivalently) to the CPs is strictly increasing with
regard to the investment of all the CPs and the ISPs. For a CP, a larger invest-
ment will attract more clicks, hence bringing more revenues from the advertisers.
The major performance measure studied in this work is the social surplus. The
authors indicate that the ratio between parameters characterizing advertising
rates and end user price sensitivity plays a key role in choosing the one-sided or
the two-sided pricing. If this ratio is either low or high, the two-sided pricing is
more favorable, and vise versa.
In [40], Zhang et al. study the competition and innovation of the service-
oriented Internet. This service-oriented Internet can be regarded as a two sided
market composed of two CPs and two ISPs. The CPs charge end users based
on their usage, while the ISPs charge them flat rate fees. The CPs engage in a
Cournot competition where the price is determined by the total demand from
the users. The ISPs engage in a Bertrand game so that they compete over the
side payment from the CPs (while not the end users). The Cournot and the
Bertrand competitions are tied together in a two-stage Stackelberg game. The
authors indicate that the update of an ISP becomes profitable only when the
increase of the marginal cost is upper bounded by an appropriate gain in its
market share.
Motivated by [26], the authors of [21] investigate network non-neutrality with
a monopoly ISP, one CP and a number of end users. The sources of income (other
than side payments) are payments of end users (to both the ISP and the CPs),
and some third party payments (e.g. publicity income) that the content providers
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receive. We formulate the price competition as a noncooperative game. The CP’s
strategy is its charging to the users, and the ISP’s strategy is the charging from
both the CP and the end user. In [21] we find that if the ISP has the power to de-
cide the side payment, not only do the CP and the end users suffer, but also the
ISP’s utility degrades. More precisely, we show that the only possible equilibrium
would be characterized by prices that will induce zero demand from the users.
This phenomenon does not occur if the CP’s payment is fixed by some regulators,
or the ISP determines the payments from the CP and the users sequentially.
We extend [21] to incorporate the QoS of users provided by the ISP in the
non-neutral model [23]. This QoS measure is different from those in [37, 43]
where more demands lead to a reduced QoS. We connect the QoS with the
incentive of ISP’s investment. A larger demand from the users means a larger
revenue, resulting in a larger bandwidth provision of the ISP and a better QoS.
The authors introduce a parameter called relative price sensitivity to model
the difference of demand sensitivities to the price of the ISP and that of the CP.
When the price paid by the CP to the ISP for per-unit of traffic is a constant, the
qualitative impact of being non-neutral is decided by the relative price sensitivity.
If this relative sensitivity is greater than 1, the users value the service of the ISP
more than that of the CP. We show that a positive payment of the CP to the
ISP leads to worse surplus of all parties involved and worse QoS of end users.
Our analysis reveals an implication that the ISP may pay to the CP of high
price sensitivity so that the CP is able to reduce its service price. This type of
reverse payment is rarely discussed in the literature of network non-neutrality.
In [24], we explore the effects of content-specific (i.e. not application neutral)
pricing, including multiple CPs providing different types of content. Also, we con-
sider competition among multiple providers of the same type, including different
models consumer stickiness (inertia or loyalty). In an on-going work, we are also
considering providers’ infrastructure and operating costs (as in, e.g. [32]), more
complex models of end-user demand and their collective social welfare, and the
effects of different options for flat-rate pricing (e.g. [33, 35]).
Noncooperative Game with QoS Differentiation Hermalin and Katz [41]
consider the two sided market with a monopolistic ISP and continuum of CPs
and end users. They compare the levels of profit, social welfare under neutral
and non-neutral regime. In the non-neutral regime they assume that the ISP
can offer a range of differentiated quality of connection qualities (e.g., an ISP
can offer different combinations of bandwidth, latency, and packet loss rate) to
the CPs and charges them depending on the type of quality of connections they
opt for. Their analysis suggests that any restriction on the ISP’s choice to offer
differentiated services will often result in poor social welfare and it improves
social welfare only under few conditions. They further observe that the small
scale content providers-the ones who are intended to benefit from regulations-
are almost always harmed by the regulations. They extend the analysis of non-
neutral regime to a Hotelling duopoly ISP model and observe that welfare results
of monopoly ISP carry over.
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Economides and Hermalin [42] study a two sided market similar to the one
in [41] by considering the affect of network congestion. They allow the amount
of information purchased by the users to vary. Their work shows restriction on
granting or selling of priority services, i.e., neutral regime leads to superior social
welfare. Further they show that the incentive to invest is ambiguous under non
neutral regime. The investment by the ISP helps to improve the overall quality of
the network and thus reducing to some degree the difference among the services
offered at discriminated prices, thus reducing the ISP’s income.
Cheng et al. [37] study a market with one ISP, two competing content
providers and a finite number of end users. The monopoly ISP provides two
type of services, the preferential and the non-preferential delivery. The content
providers can pay the ISP a fixed fee for preferential service, which implies a
non-neutral network. The authors model the QoS by the M/M/1 queueing de-
lay, and the competition of the CPs by a hotelling framework. In this paper, the
principle with no regulation is beneficial to the surplus of the ISP, while harmful
to those of the CPs. The social benefit is improved when one of the CP pays
to the ISP, but remains unchanged when both CPs join the preferential service.
The non-neutrality might lead to better QoS for a majority of users and worse
QoS of the others if the social surplus is better. The authors also observe that
the ISP has less incentive for capacity expansion in a non-neutral network.This is
because if the bandwidth is upgraded, more users experience less congestion and
switch to the non-preferential service. Thus, the difference of aggregate surplus
of the ISP before and after capacity expansion becomes smaller in a non-neutral
regime than in a neutral regime, resulting in less incentives to invest.
Choi and Kim [43] study the investment incentives with and without net-
work regulation. They consider a monopolist ISP and two CPs. Prioritization of
delivery of packets by assigning “fast lane” to one of the CPs who agree to pay
to the ISP is considered as the main mode of the non neutrality. The congestion
is taken into account by modeling the network as M/M/1 queue. They study
the neutral and non neutral regime by comparing the market equilibrium in the
short run (fixed capacity) and investment incentives in long run. They observe
that in the short run the CPs will face the prisoner’s dilemma to get access to
the fast lane and will be worse off. The social welfare improves in the non-neutral
network when there is significant asymmetry across the content providers. In the
long run they argue that contrary to ISP’s claim that net neutrality regime will
have adverse affect on their expansion, they may not have investment incentive
in the non-neutral regime. The CPs also may not have investment incentives as
they may fear that the ISP can expropriate some of the benefits made by them.
Their analysis yields ambiguous conclusions on investment incentives.
Njoroge et al. [34] consider a network where two interconnected ISPs compete
for the users and the CPs over the quality and the price. The definition of “neu-
trality” is different from that of [38]. In a neutral model, a CP pays to one ISP
for Internet access, but does not pay to the other ISP without direct connection.
In a non-neutral model, a CP has to pay to the ISP without direct connection in
order to be reachable by its end users. The inter-ISP link is bandwidth limited
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so that the quality of a user-CP connection is decided by this bottleneck. The
authors model the price and quality competition as a six-stage sequential game
and solve it using backward induction. They show that the non-neutrality is able
to improve the surplus of the ISPs, the CPs and the users. The social surplus is
also better, and the ISPs have higher incentives of investment.
Regulation Mechanisms based on Cooperative Games Giving the full
control of a market, an ISP can charge an arbitrary price from CPs for the
delivered contents. However, there does not exist such a “dictatorship” status in
reality. Recent work introduces cooperative game tools, such as Nash bargaining
game and Shapley value, to study the revenue splitting issues among the players.
Shapley value is a well known concept in cooperative game theory that pro-
vides a way of splitting revenues obtained by the cooperating players 7. It satisfies
important properties like fairness, efficiency, symmetry, additivity, etc. In [27]
Ma et al. explore Shapley pricing mechanism [45] to share the revenues from
Internet subscribers among the service providers that peer each others’ traffic.
The authors show that if Shapley value based revenue sharing is enforced at the
global level the selfish ISPs, at the Nash equilibrium point, will opt for strate-
gies that will maximize the aggregate network profits. Further extending their
work, in [28] the authors consider three type of ISPs: content ISPs, eye ball
ISPs and transit ISPs. They obtain closed form expressions of the ISPs’ rev-
enues for the bipartite topologies (each type of ISP nodes can be separated) and
give dynamic programming procedures to calculate the Shapley revenues for the
general internet topologies. With the Shapley value solution they suggest the
appropriate pricing structure for the differentiated services (non-neutral regime)
that improves social welfare.
Saavedra in [31] initially uses Nash bargaining game to study joint investment
in a non-neutral regime with one CP and two ISPs. The CP is able to negotiate
with one or the both ISPs via contracts. The author highlights the impact of
the CP’s bargaining power on QoS agreements. If the ISPs allow lower quality
of services in the non-neutral regime, the CPs with low bargaining power can
enter into the exclusive contract with ISP and improve their bargaining position.
Building upon [31], Altman et al. focus In [22] on mechanisms of setting the price
that one provider would pay to another based on the Nash bargaining paradigm.
The authors address a problem and a model that deffer however, from [31]. Two
bargaining concepts, the pre-bargaining and the post-bargaining are presented
to characterize the exact sequence of decisions that determine the side payment
as well as the other prices. The first concept is used when bargaining over the
side payment takes place before the user prices are determined. The second
one models the occurrence of bargaining after the user price competition. The
authors point out under what situations the pre-bargaining or the post-bargaining
7 On the usefulness of this concept to split profits or costs we can learn from [46]
where K Binmore writes [46]: “I was once summoned urgently to London to explain
what the French government was talking about when it suggested that the costs
of a proposed tunnel under the English Channel be allocated to countries in the
European Union using the Shapley value”
14 E. Altman et al.
is preferable. They further study another aspect of non-neutral behavior which
is the possibility for an ISP and a CP to collude together which could result in
better performances for them but a worse performance for other competing CPs.
Network Neutrality in Network Utility Maximization Issues In this
survey, we do not restrict to the papers that use game theoretic models. We
mention one more reference whose model includes some aspects of competition.
Hande et al. [39] consider the two-sided market in a quite different context.
Instead of using the predefined price-demand curve, they look into the network
utility maximization with the participation of the CPs. This model mitigates
the key drawback of economic studies that does not deal with the engineering
aspect of rate allocation. They define the utility of users as a function of flow
rates. The concept “non-neutrality” refers to the restriction on the maximum
price that the ISPs can extract from the CPs. This price restriction exhibits
different impacts on the profits concerning the power of the ISPs. In a market of
competitive ISPs, the users’ benefit and the social benefit increase as the price
restriction is relaxed. If we understand neutrality as zero payment for per-unit
of delivered content, the non-neutral regime is always favorable in terms of the
social profit and the users’ profits.
4 Conclusion
We summarized some recent aspects in the development of the Internet as well
as in the debate on its neutrality. We cover both legal aspects, economic ones
as well as technological issues. We then present an overview of research papers
on the net non-neutrality problem. We focus in particular on issues related QoS.
As a universal service, the Internet is required to guarantee certain QoS levels.
We related this to the legislation over network neutrality and to the question of
the incentives for investing in the infrastructure. We then provided an overview
of the research studies on network neutrality issues with an emphasis on using
game theoretical tools.
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